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                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                         _______________ 
 
                           NO. 95-3252  
                         _______________ 
 
                    FRANCES E. LIVINGSTONE and 
               JOSEPH A. LIVINGSTONE, her husband, 
 
                                   Appellants 
           
                                v. 
 
NORTH BELLE VERNON BOROUGH; FAYETTE CITY BOROUGH; WASHINGTON 
TOWNSHIP; FRANK E. MONACK, JR., individually and in his capacity as 
officer of WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP; OFFICER RAYMOND MOODY, individually 
and in his capacity as officer for FAYETTE CITY BOROUGH; OFFICER 
DARHL SNYDER, individually and in his capacity as an officer for 
NORTH BELLE VERNON BOROUGH 
 
                         _______________ 
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
                                   
                    D.C. No. 91-00059         
                         _______________ 
 
                     Argued January 25, 1996 
 
           Before:  COWEN and SAROKIN, Circuit Judges  
and POLLAK, District Judge 
 
                                  
                        ----------------- 
 
                   ORDER AMENDING SLIP OPINION 
 
                        ------------------ 
 
 
     It is hereby ordered that the slip opinion in the above- 
entitled appeal filed July 31, 1996 be amended in accordance with 
the following. 
 
     On page 9, the second full paragraph should read: 
 
 
          With this background history as predicate, the court 
     in Livingstone I then proceeded to review the elements of 
     proof for a showing of voluntariness, finding that the 
     parties seeking to enforce the release-dismissal 
     agreement bore the burden of showing that the 
     Livingstones' assent was "voluntary, deliberate and 
     informed."  12 F.3d at 1211.  We concluded that the 
     defendants had not met this burden with the certainty 
     called for on summary judgment, given that Mrs. 
     Livingstone was confused as to the terms of the release- 
     dismissal arrangement, that the claimed release-dismissal 
     agreement was never written down, and that the asserted 
     agreement -- assuming there was a meeting of the minds --  
     was made, if at all, during a brief and ambiguous oral 
     colloquy.  See id. at 1211-14.  Accordingly, we reversed 
     the grant of summary judgment and directed that the case 
     be remanded for further proceedings. 
 
     On page 16, the first paragraph should read: 
 
          The Livingstones also question whether North Belle 
     Vernon Borough and Fayette City Borough -- which we will 
     refer to, for brevity, as "the two boroughs" -- had the 
     same status under the release-dismissal agreement as did 
     Washington Township.  In the voluntariness proceeding in 
     the district court, counsel for the Livingstones had 
     requested that a specific question on the verdict form 
     address the status of the two boroughs under the 
     agreement.  The district court declined to include such 
     a question on the form, finding that Ceraso's statements 
     in the colloquy before Judge Cicchetti included all three 
     municipalities, and that all three therefore had the same 
     status for purposes of the voluntariness question.  In 
     response to the objections of the Livingstones' counsel 
     to this ruling, the district court permitted him to argue 
     to the jury that the ambiguous nature of the agreement 
     between the Livingstones and the two boroughs rendered 
     the release-dismissal agreement involuntary as a whole.  
     App. at 804-06. 
 
     The last paragraph on page 45 continuing on to page 46 should 
read: 
 
          However, we anticipate that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
     Court would be very attentive to how the voluntariness of 
     a release-dismissal agreement is established.  Such 
     judicial attentiveness would be called for both because 
     of the danger that such agreements will be concluded in 
     improper circumstances, and because Pennsylvania has a 
     policy of declining to enforce contracts concluded under 
     duress or threat of prosecution.  See, e.g., Germantown 
     Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 143 (Pa. Super. 
     1985) (applying a rule that threats of criminal 
     prosecution constitute duress rendering a contract 
     voidable, and stating: "It is an affront to our judicial 
     sensibilities that one person's ability to seek another's 
     prosecution can be bartered and sold the same as 
     commodities in the market place.  It is even more 
     repugnant when the foul stench of oppression pervades the 
     transaction.").  For reasons we have already discussed, 
     the voluntariness of oral release-dismissal agreements is 
     especially likely to be problematic, and -- precisely 
     because such agreements are not evidenced by a writing -- 
     determinations of the voluntariness of such agreements 
     are particularly likely to be unreliable.  See supra at 
     31-36.  Accordingly, we predict that the Pennsylvania 
     Supreme Court, when faced with the question, will subject 
     the voluntariness of oral release-dismissal agreements to 
     a heightened standard of proof, and we therefore conclude 
     that the voluntariness of the release-dismissal agreement 
     now before us must be demonstrated by clear and 
     convincing evidence. 
 
 
                                        BY THE COURT: 
 
                                                                                        
/s/ Louis H. Pollak 
                                                             
                                             District Judge 
 
 
Dated:  August 14, 1996 
